How Lalit Modi sold the IPL after 1,000 rejections—and bet his entire career on it

From broadcaster refusals to billion-dollar ambition, Lalit Modi reveals how the IPL was built against disbelief across the cricket and business ecosystem

Lalit Modi smiling alongside Indian Premier League IPL logo representing cricket league branding

The Indian Premier League today sits at the centre of cricket’s global economy, often viewed as an inevitability.

But in Lalit Modi’s telling, its creation was anything but certain—it was repeatedly dismissed, misunderstood, and nearly abandoned before it ever reached a broadcast screen.

A vision that predated the IPL

Long before the IPL became a commercial benchmark, Modi’s ambition was already defined. “The idea to me was always to be the biggest league in the world,” he said in an interview with Sportstar, outlining a vision that stretches back to the early 1990s.

That initial concept, however, did not carry the IPL name. “When I conceived it in the early ‘90s, it was called the Indian Cricket League. If you check who owns the domain name, it is not Subhash Chandra. It’s Lalit Modi.”

The early iteration was not merely theoretical. Modi detailed how it was structured as a fully operational competition with city-based teams and secured player commitments. “It was all set up, approved by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). We spent $17 million to $20 million. All the top players were hired. It was an eight-team format: Delhi Panthers, Mohali Stallions, Gwalior Cobras, Calcutta Tigers, Bangalore Bulls, Chennai Tuskers.”

That project ultimately did not materialise, forcing a reset that would later evolve into the IPL model.

Rejections across broadcasters and investors

When the IPL concept resurfaced years later, the biggest challenge was not execution—it was belief.

Modi described a near-universal lack of buy-in across the ecosystem. “We went to all the broadcasters. Nobody came in. Everybody came back with a no.”

The resistance extended well beyond media companies. “I’m making presentations to over 1,000 businessmen. Ninety-nine per cent didn’t understand what we were talking about.”

Even within cricket’s governing structure, the concept struggled for support, with Modi noting that “not a single person could understand except for two.”

This disconnect forced a fundamental rethink of how the league would position itself commercially.

Designing a product for advertisers, not just fans

Rather than building purely for cricket audiences, Modi reframed the IPL as an entertainment property competing directly with mainstream television.

“I needed to attract the audience of the Saas Bahu shows on TV. That’s where the money was. The bulk of the Indian advertising money sat on the eight o’clock time slot,” he explained.

That insight reshaped the league’s core format. “I decided to do a paradigm shift. Night cricket. Eight o’clock start. Music, dancing, fun.”

The strategy was explicitly commercial, targeting a broader demographic base. “I needed to attract women and children… that is where the money was.”

The result was a product engineered not just for cricket fans, but for primetime television economics.

Rivalries, rights, and early resistance

As the IPL framework took shape, Modi’s first major outreach was to a familiar name in Indian media. “When I was launching the IPL, the first person I went to was Subhash Chandra. I said, ‘Would you like to buy the IPL rights?’”

The response did not align with his plans. “He picked up two of my people to develop the Indian Cricket League.”

At the same time, securing broadcast backing remained critical. “I explained, the first pillar is the broadcaster. Without broadcasting, we don’t have a pillar,” he said, highlighting the centrality of media rights to the league’s viability.

Even when interest emerged, it came with strict conditions. “We will buy it, provided you have the top 100 players.”

That requirement triggered a parallel race to secure player participation while negotiations around rights continued.

A billion-dollar gamble in the media rights market

The IPL’s media rights process became a defining moment in its early trajectory.

“So, Sony signed the contract as a sub-licensee of World Sports Group. There were only three bidders, ESPN, World Sports Group, and Sony,” Modi recalled, outlining a tightly contested bidding environment.

One proposal reflected a performance-based model, with ESPN offering, “If we do well, we’ll give you 50 per cent.”

But the process was far from straightforward. “Before I opened the Sony bid, minutes before, they withdrew. It was hand in glove. I’m in front of live media. I don’t know what’s going to come.”

What followed was a defining strategic moment. “I opened the World Sports Group bid. It’s a billion dollars. It was a mindset number… I needed the headline to be, ‘IPL has the audacity to ask for a billion dollars’. So, we have a billion-dollar cheque guaranteed. We don’t have a broadcaster at that point in time.”

The valuation itself became part of the league’s positioning, signalling ambition even before operational certainty was secured.

Selling belief to franchise owners

With broadcast momentum taking shape, attention shifted to franchise sales—but skepticism persisted.

“4th of January was the opening of the franchisee tenders. The minimum bid price was 50 million paid over 10 years,” Modi said, outlining the entry threshold for team ownership.

The pitch was structured to emphasise long-term upside. “If you bid a minimum of 50, I’m going to give you back five. You’re only giving me five; the rest is your ego money.”

Beyond the entry price, the proposition was built around diversified revenue streams, with franchise owners positioned to generate income through ticket sales, team sponsorships, in-stadium food and beverage, and a significant share of centrally pooled league revenues—creating a model designed to balance upfront risk with long-term commercial upside.

He reinforced the scale of the opportunity to potential investors. “If you believe in me, it’ll be so big, you don’t have to ever look back.”

Yet major corporate groups remained unconvinced. “None of them believed it, Airtel, Tata group, Birla group, ICICI, HDFC. None of them believed it.”

To close deals, Modi escalated the stakes. “If the IPL doesn’t work in year one, I will tear up all these agreements and cancel IPL year two.”

A personal bet that reshaped cricket

Beyond institutional resistance, the IPL’s launch became a personal risk for its architect.

“I put my entire career on the line. I put all my goodwill on the line,” Modi said, underscoring the level of commitment required to push the project forward.

Operationally, the league was built through direct intervention. “We formed our own team, paid from our own pocket… and with Sharad Pawar, we got it up and running.”

External factors also contributed to building momentum, with India’s 2007 T20 World Cup victory playing a catalytic role. “India winning over Pakistan, huge, huge. We bring them back as heroes. Millions of people come. That helped it.”

From there, the IPL transitioned from concept to execution, overcoming the resistance that had defined its early years.

“And fortunately for us, it worked.”

The league’s eventual success now stands in contrast to its origins—an idea that struggled for acceptance, required structural reinvention, and ultimately reshaped the commercial architecture of cricket.

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